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The new africa and brazil in the lula era:  
the rebirth of brazilian atlantic policy
A Nova África e o Brasil na era Lula:  
o renascimento da política atlântica brasileira
 JOSé FLÁvIO SOMBrA SArAIvA*
The main purpose of the present text is to present a relevant regional 
dimension regarding Brazil’s international insertion during the Lula era. Africa 
has been one of the major fronts of Brazilian international insertion over the first 
years of the 21st century. The African continent has a significant historical weight 
in our constitution as a nation and is also part of the moves adopted by Brazil’s 
foreign policy. Brazil decided to play in the new political “chessboard” in which 
the international context of post-Cold War world consists.
The government headed by President Lula (2003 – 2010) revived in more 
permanent bases Brazil’s foreign policy towards Africa. This new measure seems to 
be closer to a State policy and tends to overcome some of the reasons for historical 
oscillations considering Brazil’s path in the South Atlantic area. Idealism and 
realism are gathered in an extremely balanced way supporting the foreign policy 
conducted by our national State in relation to its Atlantic boundaries.
In this sense, the present work is divided in two parts: the first part approaches 
Africa’s international insertion throughoutthe recent years and the second one is 
oriented to analyze the dimension occupied by African affairs in Brazil during 
the Lula era. The historical evolution described on the second part is crucial to 
emphasize what is novelty about the current relationship involving Brazil’s Atlantic 
borders and its different perspectives.
a new africa coincides with a global brazil
International circumstances experienced during the turn to the present 
century have been extremely favorable to Africa’s international insertion. Years 
separating 1999 from today represent almost one decade of struggle and obstacle 
overcoming. Compared to the previous four decades, marked by low economic 
continuity, fractures in the formation of national States and very low social 
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standard levels, there is a new Africa represented by the relatively successful results 
experienced over the first decade of the 21st century. 
Noticeable economic development in a recent cycle (1999-2008) has brought 
structural consistency to the modernization of the African continent, which 
comprises a territory of thirty million square meters. This is truly a novelty in 
African states’ recent history, born as a result of the first series of independence 
processes happening by the end of the 1950’s and beginning of the 60’s.
All quantitative and qualitative data produced by international agencies, as 
well as the rulers of the fifty-four African States, have brought about significant 
empirical evidence concerning initial assertions. Economists, governments, as 
well as Chinese and American companies, and even balance sheets carried on 
by Brazilian companies and government entities, have confirmed the historical 
improvement witnessed over the other side of the South Atlantic in the early 21st 
century.
Nearly 700 million Africans now behold a new hope for normalization, after 
decades of turmoil, structural crises and historical difficulties in the fields of social 
asymmetry and economic dependence on their former metropolises. Acknowledged 
as global capitalism’s last investment frontier, Africa has recently captured the 
attention of the international community. This has been Africa’s opportunity to, 
through economic growth, pursuit political normalization as well as to promote 
the pacification of its internal conflicts such as the ones held among the different 
National States within the continent.
The expectations which made Africa prominent in the international system 
have been extremely relevant considering a continent dwelled by States counting 
only half a century of formal autonomy after the colonial cycle. It’s likely that 
over the first decade of the present century, Africa has been overcoming the 
historical drama regarding its internal wars and political violence. Despite the 
gravity properly applied to the case of Darfur, the number of African countries 
involved in internal armed conflicts decreased from 13 to 5, between 2001 and 
2008. These conflicts have been the most important immediate cause of the high 
poverty levels in the continent. Their drastic reduction suggests that resources, an 
estimated amount of US$ 300 billion spent in the wars between 1990 and 2005, 
may now be directed to poverty eradication policies.
The new setting in international affairs over the second semester of 2008 
and first half of 2009, especially regarding the economic fields, has called the 
attention of African leaders and made them reflect. The initial concern was that 
the global economic crisis would reach the periphery of capitalism, especially 
most African countries, resulting in a “domino effect”, following the pattern of 
instability originated in North-American capitalism and its European extensions.
The crisis, born due to capital toxicity, the most relevant global fact in the 
second half of 2008 after its migration to productive activities by the end of that 
year, became more serious and was already geographically widespread. This crisis 
























intensifying in the first months of 2009 was no surprise to the ordinary observers 
of global affairs.
Had the crisis stricken the whole world? The logic in which each new 
economic index is presented by government authorities in different parts of the 
planet frustrated the initial hope. Fatalism was intense and had proportionally 
reached the other villainous logic that prevailed in a relatively recent historical 
paradigm: the one marked by euphoric triumphalism from the ones who had 
declared the “End of History” in the early 90’s, followed by the rise of “a liberal 
paradise”.  
There was somehow panic in Africa. It was soon noticed that the context was 
not as atrocious as it was believed to be. Eventually, Africa had not been completely 
affected by the congenial pessimism previously witnessed. There the context was 
slightly different from what it is likely to be in capitalism’s traditional areas and 
in the most prominent part comprising the emerging countries in the South. 
Macroeconomic normalization rates are rather positive, public management has 
improved and African economies have not been as much affected as were some 
central areas of modern capitalism. The continent is still living a cycle of growth. 
And this development has been considered the most sustainable one since the 
independence movements in early 1960’s. Moreover, the 2010 Soccer World Cup 
was an effort in order to improve the negative values attributed to the continent 
and turn them into a positive perspective. South Africa represented, through the 
soccer championship, the yearning of a whole continent.
Naturally, Africa is not totally immune to global crises. Chinese retraction 
has caused some impact over the continent. However, the advancement of 
capitals coming from the Persian Gulf has compensated credit and infrastructural 
financing of some new projects headed by NEPAD, enabling the African initiative 
regarding sustainable development and social incorporation of the ones seen as 
more vulnerable.
Despite the effect of a pessimist fever contamination, Africa is one of the 
very few parts of the planet in which the talk on crisis has not acquired a relevant 
proportion. Partly, due to the fact that the crisis has been a lasting picture 
considering African geography. The continent has been a “laboratory” testing 
the most inadequate models of development, citizenship matters as well as the 
continent’s autonomy and decision-making power, for several years in a row. Now 
what they wish to have Africa for the Africans, what has somehow been seen as a 
kind of Monroe Doctrine on the other side of the South Atlantic. There has been 
a huge feeling of pride comprised in the talks of continental Africanity held in 
South-African stadiums during the last the 2010 Soccer World Cup.
For the pessimists, it’s only possible to talk about Africa in turmoil times 
which generated real humanitarian tragedies or in times of corrupt governments. 
In fact, these matters deserve total attention and care from international public 
José Flávio Sombra Saraiva
172
opinion, but there are certainly other “Africas”. There are “Africas”, acknowledged 
by North-American Freedom House’s reports, which have reduced conflicts and 
enabled the advancement of “free” political regimes. 
Besides the situation in Darfur, Congo, the case of Somali pirates or 
Zimbabwe’s previous regime, or even despite corruption problems in South Africa, 
more than 50% of current African governments are considered democratic or 
witness a process of democratic normalization. President Obama is aware of this 
fact and is known to have his plan for Africa. Brazil, currently ruled by President 
Lula, began its adequate inflection towards Africa way before. 
There are even some important lessons learned from Africa. Angola’s 
economic growth rate, which has proven to remain among 7%, is a very auspicious 
fact. Such growth is also noticed in Eastern Africa, Ethiopia and Ghana, located in 
Guinea’s Atlantic Gulf. The same could be applied to what happened in Northern 
Africa, to the Algerian case, anchored on oil and on a project of economic and 
political leadership in the region.
Despite the fact that the continent was not stricken by the crisis as announced 
by many defeatist heralds, Africa is still haunted by ancient challenges which do 
not evolve on the same path of its integration in the global society. Four main 
challenges, among others, can be named and developed into relevant themes for 
reflection for the next few years in Africa. 
The first are the low rates of alternation in power within the continent. The 
lack of electoral alternation in not a novel theme, but it presents new outlines over 
the second decade of the current century. These dubious regimes and governments, 
going through a very slow institutionalization process, unhurriedly substitute the 
precedent rulers for other elites, which are more refreshed and modernized.
The second challenge is penetration of international narcotraffic within 
Africa, considering the constitution of new elites and other sectors of urban 
populations in the continent’s metropolises. This is a relatively new aspect rooted 
in the ancient resource wars in Africa, or the well-known blood diamond wars, 
like the ones in Western Africa and in Angola, now presenting new versions.
There are growing concerns with respect to the so called “African bridge”, 
emerging between Latin America and Europe, involving people and drug 
smuggling. There is strong evidence of international trafficking corridors, 
which associate coca paste producers in South America to the transportation 
and preparation of new products in West Africa and its manipulation process in 
Africa and Europe. 
There are few available data with regard to this subject. However, they seem 
to be enough to form an assumption that those interests, a reality in international 
political economy, are vivid in Africa’s current economic and political affairs. 
What has been noticed is the rise of parasite states, directly attached to this 
international threat.
























The third challenge is placed in the exclusive field of public policies conducted 
so that they can improve financial gains attained over recent years, emerging from 
capitalism’s highest rates of development in its history. It is also known that this 
wave’s balance has been broken and that global economic growth is on its way to 
be reestablished and tends, modestly, to follow its path for many years. This has 
great implications towards African public policies aiming sustainable development 
as well as social inclusion.
The new order emerging before the end of what was considered a “golden 
decade”, presenting a more modest economic growth, will demand important 
choices coming from African leaders and society members. If back in 2007, before 
the impact caused by the global international crisis, 37 African countries (almost 
two thirds of all continental nations), used to grow beyond 4% a year, and 34 
were classified by Freedom House as free or partially free, how can this pace be 
kept within a context marked by less capital available to be invested in Africa 
over the next decade?
Besides the ancient challenges, which remain resilient in Africa’s recent history 
of international insertion, difficulties associated to the changes in progress in the 
international order linger. Africa will need an élite showing more commitment 
concerning decision-making autonomy and a positive integration of the continent 
to global economic processes, as well as a balance between moral and power, and 
among interests and international cooperation on the 21st century.
African economists and Africanists claim that the economic growth witnessed 
by Africa along the first golden decade of the 21st century is not likely to follow 
previous patterns. Although Africa, according to OCDE, has been receiving more 
resources coming from investments than from international aid, this equation 
may be inverted if there is not responsibility from the part of its rulers within 
this important chapter of economic normalization already held in Africa despite 
serious internal costs.
Inflation control and fiscal responsibility have been important moves on 
macroeconomic normalization headed by African governments in the African 
continent by the end of the 1990’s and beginning of 2000’s. The throwback in 
these fields and the re-establishment of the external debt cycle would be fatal 
considering the partial improvements achieved so far.
The fourth and last challenge to be faced by Africans in the coming years in 
the temptation to, considering possible new difficulties rising from the international 
front, make use of victimhood excuses. This argument, of great political efficacy 
for African wicked elites, does not fit the Africans who build their future based 
on their daily lives.
Africa has proven that even humanitarian initiatives, like the aid provided 
in the 1990’s, have brought very few practical advantages to the target population, 
and have eventually reinforced power schemes ruled by elites. External aid, 
attached by extreme ties with predominant elites, who contribute to intensify 
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social, economic and political differences, is a conspiracy against Africa in the 
sense that the continent tends to remain infantilized in some sectors due to this 
kind of false pity.
brazil’s action in africa during the lula administration  
and some historical background
During the golden decade of economic growth, which comprises the first 
ten years of the present century, Brazil increased its participation in investment, 
commercial presence, creation of new embassies and on its strategic and political 
weight in the African continent. Brazil has gained ground in its Eastern borders. 
What happened was the replacement of a silent period in its relationship with 
Africa for a cycle of cooperation and common altruistic projects for the other side 
of the South Atlantic.
There are ancient ties which attach Brazil and the African continent. In 
actions and mental constructions, Africa became a participant in institutions, 
economy, multiple identities and in the culture in Brazil. Slavery and slave traffic 
over the Atlantic have surely initiated this common history, which attached Brazil 
and Africa from the 16th century up to the end of the 19th century.
There was also a historical construction that affected diplomacy and 
Brazil’s international relations during the second half of the 20th century. The 
relations between Brazil and Africa tended to have a minor role in the national-
developmentist foreign policy adopted by President Vargas as well as the following 
governments. 
There’s a certain consensus that establishes that the rebirth of Brazil’s foreign 
policy towards Africa started in early 60’s, during the administrations of presidents 
Jânio Quadros (1961) and João Goulart (1961-1964). This would have been a 
natural consequence of the independence process of most African Countries 
between 1957 and 1960. However, the analysis of diplomatic documents available 
on the economic reports, as well as the parliamentary papers, prove that the initial 
elements of Brazilian policy towards Africa have their origin between the end of 
the 40’s and beginning of the 50’s. 
Among the themes directly referring to Africa considered by Brazilian 
diplomacy between 1946 and 1961, it is important to highlight: international 
investment in the development of Latin America and Africa, the competition 
between Brazilian and African primary products in the international market, 
the perspective of partnership between Brazil and South-Africa, the special 
liaisons involving Brazil and Portugal through the Luso Brazilian community, 
and eventually, the first consequences of African decolonization in the South 
Atlantic area.
Brazil left World War II decided to expand its industrialization and to 
conquer a certain regional influence. This is the basis of the inclusion of Africa 
























in the country’s international agenda, initially as a minor actor and later, in the 
1950’s, as a growing element of interest. 
Nonetheless, the origins of the most classic model of the Brazilian policy 
towards Africa must be particularly identified in the 1960’s, considering the 
Brazilian effort to promote economic development. Brazil’s approach towards 
Africa has been permeated for ideological representations of the role Brazil would 
have in the future of Africa. Brazil’s natural vocation regarding that continent 
was equally an important component of the rising policy, which found adepts and 
skeptical inquirers. The governments ruled by Jânio Quadros and João Goulart, 
considering the context of independent foreign policy, have been the basis to 
the acceleration of a policy based on the support of the numerous independence 
processes, which started to blossom in Africa. Itamaraty, in particular, sent a great 
number of missions and established in that continent the first Brazilian embassies.
The period that ranges from 1964 to 1969 is, in a general way, a moment 
of oscillation in the liaisons involving Brazil and Africa, when compared to the 
improvement noticed in Quadros and Goulart’s Independent Foreign Policy. 
But the drawback did not mean a complete relinquishment of Africa. In a way it 
substituted the emphasis in the political and economic cooperation with Africa for 
the geopolitical approach, a concept in complete synchrony with the new forces 
ruling Brazil after the 1964 coup d’état. This happened, in special, due to the 
restoration of the liberal standards associated to the administration of President 
Castelo Branco (1964-1967) and its emphasis on internal and external defense 
against the communist threat. 
The necessity of adjustment with the Western world, in the fashion of 
interdependence, placed Brazil’s foreign affairs at the service of the traditional 
alignment with the United States, as previously during President Dutra’s 
administration.
The third military government (1969 – 1974) explicitly promoted the 
reanimation of the relations with Africa. This flow was reinforced during the fourth 
and fifth military administrations (1974-1985), and remained influent during the 
first civilian government and the transition to democracy (1985-1990). The signs 
of this re-establishment had existed since the “Prosperity Diplomacy” times, but 
its reassurance had only reappeared more clearly during Médici’s government. 
The Foreign Minister of Brazil, Gibson Barbosa and his visit to nine countries 
in Black Africa (1972) was the most evident demonstration of the official efforts 
to reach Africa and symbolized the reactivation of Brazilian Diplomacy towards 
it and the goals to readapt the African continent into Brazilian markets. At the 
same time, the African policy had its own function in the conservative project of 
modernization of military governments considering national development and 
the growth of Brazil’s autonomous role in the international system.
Brazil’s insertion in international relations during the 70’s led the country 
to reinforce cooperation with Black Africa, especially with Nigeria; as well as 
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to develop a cooperation policy with the new socialist countries in Africa; and 
to review the traditional cooperation with South-Africa; and especially to end 
the alignment with Portugal and is colonialist interests in Africa. The official 
recognition of Angola’s independence in 1975 was the climax amid the new 
standards of international relations between Africans and Brazil. 
Brazil’s foreign policy towards Africa at the given period, used to have four 
principles that are enough to justify it. Firstly, it was intimately associated with the 
maintenance of the national developmentist project (expansion and modernization 
headed by the State) through an aggressive and effective international strategy. 
Secondly, the core of international affairs between Brazil and Africa used to 
be economic and commercial pragmatism. At the same time its vulnerability on 
energy sources led Brazil to include an oil supply policy through Africa.
Thirdly, Brazil kept, through African policy, its influence over the South 
Atlantic area. The South American giant also developed its interests via the 
stimulation of economic relations in a peaceful fashion, without the militarization 
of that region, or direct interference of other internationally powerful countries or 
security pacts with South Atlantic Treaty Organization (SATO). This represented 
the end of geopolitical calculations and the rise of a modern strategic conception.
At last, Brazil built new ties with countries presenting Portuguese expression, 
but that were not attached to the traditional Luso-Brazilian Community. The 
defense of common culture and history started to take place through a direct 
and independent cooperation system with the above-mentioned in Black African 
countries. 
The institution of a pragmatic foreign policy directed the governments 
of Médici and Geisel to criticize the distribution of power in the international 
system, which, for them, would harden the possibility of appearance of new 
power poles such as Brazil. This implied direct criticism towards the United 
States. At the same time, it relocated Brazilian strategy to search new partners in 
the international system and the diversification of contacts without taking into 
account the ideological frontiers which used to be so relevant to Castelo Branco’s 
administration. The expansion of trade involving Brazil, Africa, the Middle East 
and Latin America was one of the most important changes happening in the field 
of foreign economic affairs in the 1970’s and part of the 1980’s. Brazilian exports 
to third world countries increased from 12% in 1967 to 26% eleven years later. 
In 1981, for instance, Brazil sold 52% of its manufactured exports to the Third 
World against 46% sold to Northern industrialized countries.
Brazil’s new perspectives were a result of the growing complexity of the 
international system itself, which ranged from a rigid polarization to a relative 
decrease in the power of The United States in the Western system, as well as the 
rise of important rivals such as Japan and Western Europe. The uncertainties of 
the international scenario demanded a more flexible and pragmatic action on the 
part of Brazilian diplomacy.
























Africa turned out to have more functional and supplementary relevance to 
Brazil’s foreign policy. Politically, the African continent used to be a potential 
source of support to common demands in the dialogue between North and South, 
in the UN, as well as in other multilateral entities. Economically, the previous 
policy could be translated into mutual economic interests serving Brazilian 
pragmatism. Simultaneously, the country’s energy supply vulnerability went on 
being a huge concern to the rulers of Brazilian foreign policy in the 70’s and part of 
the 80’s. Nigeria and Angola were oil suppliers, and, in a certain way, represented 
to Brazil a spot of diversification away from its own vulnerability.
The new objectives designed by Brazil towards Africa turned out to be better 
defined: a)to project the image of a tropical industrial power and b) to convince 
African States that the liaisons established between Brazil and Portugal should 
not inhibit the development of an intense relationship with the now independent 
Black Africa.
The pursuit for new markets, especially for manufactured goods, was also 
well accepted by the strategist military sectors, which had spoken almost exclusively 
in terms of Brazil’s military hegemony in the South Atlantic. The importance of 
the South Atlantic as a vital area was maximized by the necessity of increasing oil 
imports and exports. More than 90% of Brazilian trade was transported, as it is 
nowadays, through the sea, especially by Cape Route, surrounding South Africa.
President José Sarney (1985-1990) also kept the standards towards Africa 
previously defined by Geisel and Figueiredo during their administrations. The 
approach was that there was no reason to change foreign policy during the 
transition from an authoritarian to a democratic regime. Brazil’s African policy 
had acquired a peculiar consistence and diffusion in many areas of political society 
in the surroundings of the South Atlantic. Still during Sarney’s administration, 
Brazil reinforced criticism to apartheid editing Law nº 91.524, in August 9th, 1985. 
The new canon imposed sanctions against South Africa. It was exactly during 
Sarney’s administration that Brazil headed, in the United Nations, the movement 
in favor of the resolution that eventually declared, in 1986, the South Atlantic as 
a zone of peace and cooperation. This act ended up confirming the dimension 
of Brazil’s policy towards Africa carefully assembled since the end of the 1970’s 
during the administration of President Figueiredo, in order to avoid South Africa 
from establishing a regional security, in a way, similar to NATO.
There were several obstacles to Brazil’s economic presence in Africa. Firstly, 
there was a variety of markets and a great number of discrepancies in the capacity 
to consume among African economies. Brazilian companies had to face cultural 
diversity, the lack of new interlocutors, and the different government languages. 
The second obstacle was Africa’s low industrialization levels. The continent 
used to have a very limited number of manufactured goods able to be introduced 
in Brazilian markets. There was also a significant limitation of credits for exporting 
in those countries.
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The third barrier was probably the most crucial. Brazilian trade had to 
face the privileged relationship kept between African economies and their 
former metropolises. Those markets had been engrossed since colonial times 
and preferential deals between African producers and the European Economic 
Community had been signed at the time of Africa’s emancipation. The most 
serious consequence originated from the traditional alliance between African 
producers and European markets was that transportation, freight and financing 
were directed exclusively to Europe.   
The 1990’s were marked by equidistance between Brazil and the African 
continent. The president elected in 1990 managed to reinforce the ties with the 
developed countries. Collor de Mello, promising to lead Brazil, once again, through 
the paths of development and modern capitalism, decided to push Africa aside 
and reinforce liaisons preferably with developed Western economies. He tried to 
recover the original standards of associated liberalism in his declarations and first 
actions as a ruler, but soon Collor had to surrender to the strength of nationalism 
and a whole diplomatic tradition of partner-countries diversification, which was 
the basis of Brazilian foreign policy. This is essential in order to understand 
Fernando Collor de Mello’s trip to four Southern African countries in September, 
1991 reproducing the same speech which had been the basis for the relationship 
between Brazil and Africa during the previous decade.
Anyway, the decreasing trend was evident. The economic crisis in Africa in 
early 1990’s became more serious than the crisis striking Latin America. African 
markets tended to be more reduced as well the region’s influence in the transition 
of a post cold war world. Brazil, on the other hand, was no longer facing energy 
shortage, a fact that in the past had triggered the country’s policy regarding 
Africa. This way, the levels of trade established between Brazil and Black Africa 
had returned to the numbers registered in the 1950’s and 60’s. In the 1990’s, trade 
between Brazil and Africa would not reach 2% of the first country’s commercial 
relations amount, after having reached around 10% in early 80’s.
The low rates did not necessarily mean the end of the contracts and deals. 
Brazil maintained its presence in Africa, particularly in the economic field, because 
some companies had decided to remain in the continent. There was also the rise 
of a new identity in the field of political agreement, especially since the end of 
apartheid in South Africa in 1994. Foreign policy towards Africa would remain 
in a more selective way, with specific and numbered priorities in the continent. 
The great extent of the policy towards Africa in the 1970’s and part of the 1980’s 
had been replaced by a more limited focus which included very few countries, 
regions and themes.
The changes regarding African dimension in the international insertion 
of Brazil were noticed in the initiatives during President Inácio Lula da Silva’s 
first trips to a number of countries in Southern, Central, Atlantic and Northern 
Africa in 2003 and 2004. This way, there was evidence of a new political will 
























which aimed the inversion of the picture of oscillation and inconsistence of the 
1990’s. But the initiatives did not bring immediate results so that Brazil’s good 
will towards Africa was acknowledged once Africans were already used to gestures 
based on advancements followed by several drawbacks from the part of Brazil.  
According to Brazilian public opinion, the most important of president 
Lula’s disembarks were the ones to sub-Saharan Africa. The first visit happened 
in the end of 2003 when the president visited Angola, Mozambique, South Africa, 
Namibia and São Tomé and Príncipe. The second was the journey to São Tomé 
and Príncipe, Cape Verde and Gabon, in 2004. 
In both cases the president was accompanied by a huge delegation, including 
a number of ministries, entrepreneurs and intellectuals. In Brazil, the trip was seen 
as a symbolic gesture and the rebirth of a new cycle comprising our relationship 
with South Atlantic countries. Nevertheless, other heralds highlighted the scarce 
possibilities for a renewed agenda including that continent, once it had been 
dominated by collective tragedies and economic and social underdevelopment.
The fact is that the revival of Brazil’s African policy by the beginning of the 
21st century has been held in a new background. Firstly, there is a coordinated 
strategy based on national interests and its protagonists, including entrepreneurs in 
charge of the expansion of Brazilian capitalism and diplomatic agents. Undoubtedly, 
a political fact that can be considered a landmark to the rebirth of this policy was 
the Brazil-Africa Forum: Politics, Cooperation and Commerce, held in Fortaleza, 
in may, 2003, which provided a strategic closure to the decision process. 
There are conceptual, as well as practical, innovations considering the 
reactivation of Brazil’s Eastern surroundings as one of the preferable regions 
for contacts, cooperation and trade. One of them is the re-examination of the 
previous “culturalist” speeches in favor of a more structural and pragmatic 
approach regarding the cooperation with African elites. Consequently, there is a 
reconsideration of traditional themes concerning Brazilian “Africanity” and its 
connection with the idea of an assertive foreign policy towards Africa.
Lula, along with the Brazilian diplomacy, has innovated considering the 
country’s proximity with the African continent. This was, partly, the end of 
the traditional culturalist speech that had historically permeated the inflections 
involving Brazil and Africa. This concept was replaced by another talk: the one 
based on Brazil’s historical debt in relation to Africa. The moral debt, acknowledged 
not only by the president, but also by a great part of Brazilian society, demands 
a new form to constitute the country’s foreign policy. 
The second conceptual dimension is its character, against the merely 
instrumental function previously noticed in the field of the liaisons between Brazil 
and Africa already scrutinized along this chapter. The renewed policy towards 
Africa was made more public and legitimated by a social and political consensus 
in Brazilian society, through institutions such as the parliament, universities, 
African-Brazilian groups, companies and public opinion most interested agents.
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If Africa is a privileged source for the formation of a Brazilian identity, 
cultivated and developed as time goes by, a policy for the African continent could 
not obliterate such particularity. This way, the identification of contemporary 
African leaderships advocating a new discourse towards Brazil has presented 
extremely different images compared to the ones previously formulated by Brazil 
in Africa.
In previous decades, Brazilian politicians, military agents and entrepreneurs, 
made use of what was then known as cultural solidarity, most of the times without 
the African part’s acquiescence. In many aspects this expression caused a series of 
illusions. We believed we used to have a natural place or position in Africa, that we 
were the only way to bridge metropolitan Europe and extremely poor Africans, as 
reminded by President Jânio Quadros during the initiatives of revival of Brazil’s 
African policy in early 60’s.
These symbols are a novelty concerning Brazilian foreign policy and must be 
celebrated. There is a clear reversion in the illusions which once considered Brazil 
a racial democracy, able to function as a role model to Africa, in favor of a more 
multicultural country, which has numerous similarities with African social realities.
However, the words and gestures did not remain in theory. The practical 
attitudes applied to Africa were the redesign of a way to collaborate with the 
agenda of sustainable development towards our Atlantic surroundings. Africans 
do not want to find in Brazil anything related to a possible historical forgiveness. 
This has been extremely clear through the speech analysis of African intellectuals 
and diplomatic agents. What they want is to talk about the future and about the 
possibilities for Brazil to contribute to that continent’s sustainable development.
In this sense, the new foreign policy adopted by Brazil towards Africa in the 
beginning of the 21st century is not a re-edition of the past. It’s bolder in order 
to inhibit international assistencialism, disguised in the most varied forms of old 
fashioned technical cooperation, so that it will be part of the reconstruction of a 
logistic and productive infrastructure in Africa. It also encompasses a dimension 
related to citizenship and acknowledgement: the cooperation programs aiming 
to combat AIDS, the experiences involving SEBRAE, EMBRAPA’s expertise, 
among other several companies from Brazil, which have been active in a number 
of African countries over the last years.
Considering foreign policy matters, Brazil has been working with Africa in 
favor of a South-South adjustment so that it is possible to build a common platform 
of interests. The mutual access involving Brazil and Africa and agricultural products 
in Northern markets has been defining interests on international negotiations. 
From Doha to Cancún and considering the establishment of G-20, Brazil has 
become a huge representative of African affairs in the international system.
IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) has been prodigious regarding 
cooperation in aspects of interest in a multilateral world. This forum has served 
as tripartite power regarding international relations in the South. Defense services, 
























business companies, social communities and intellectuals converge on mutual 
knowledge and practical experiences of interaction; smaller businesses follow the 
model established by SEBRAE, among other markedly varied aspects.
In the economic field, and besides the crisis experienced by the end of 2008 
and beginning of 2009, Brazil has collaborated with Africa in the sense of a positive 
outcome, which is a sign of global economic recovery and of the logistic concept 
of the domestication of globalization through the reinforcement of the State’s 
inductive character. This is noticed considering mutual initiatives of multilateral 
economic entities.
Regarding bilateral and interregional perspectives, the association between 
Brazil and Africa in South-South cooperative projects, involves direct investment 
from Brazilian companies operating in African countries in a more state-of-the-
art actuation; this trend does not reinforce what used to be called a third world 
culture, but on the contrary, is deeply inspiring to Brazilians and Africans. Such 
association, in a certain way, was noticeable on WTO (World Trade Organization) 
conference in Doha; it was more widely discussed during the following conference 
in Cancún, and while most recent negotiations took place, in Geneva, Brazil and 
India represent the G-20 in the reversion of protectionist agricultural policies in 
hegemonic countries. These are victories, which should not only be attributed to 
Brazil or the hugest agricultural countries, but also to the smaller cotton producers 
in Africa, for instance. 
This new trend involving Brazil and Africa in which the initiative to act 
in a collective way prevails, is what Africans crave for. It’s a way that has been 
demonstrating its effectiveness and that clarifies what can still be done, in such a 
coordinated action, based on the idea of a sustainable development. The findings 
resulted from the General Assembly of UNCTAD in Rio de Janeiro (2004), in 
the same context where Africans and Brazilians celebrated their achievements 
in new rounds of international trade against hatred subsidies to European and 
North American producers; this context tends to advocate that a new South is 
rising, forming anti-hegemonic coalitions in which Brazil and a number of African 
countries have been taking part of. 
From the viewpoint of global themes, this practice to work along with 
Africans allows Brazil to envision to the possibility of designing a common plan 
for social and economic development of their populations as well as entitling a 
new ground for Brazil and Africa among the other nations.
This way, it is right to conclude that the Lula era helped to structure a policy 
based on permanence and continuity along its Atlantic border. This has been an 
extremely positive achievement considering Lula’s eight years ahead of Brazilian 
government. This virtuous circle is expected, at a certain level, to express the 
political maturity achieved by a State policy aimed at South Atlantic countries 
and go beyond a mere passing fad.
José Flávio Sombra Saraiva
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abstract
In the post-Cold War world, Africa has been an important focus of Brazilian foreign policy. 
Having a significant historical weight in building our nation, African countries are also 
part of the moves adopted by Brazil’s foreign policy. The main purpose of the present 
text is to show this relevant regional dimension regarding Brazil’s international insertion 
during the Lula era. The work is divided in two parts: the first part approaches Africa’s 
international insertion throughout recent years and the second analyses the dimension 
occupied by African affairs in Brazil during the Lula era. The main argument is that the 
new role played by Africa in the international scene coincides with a global Brazil. 
resumo
No mundo pós-Guerra Fria, a África tem tido um papel de destaque para política externa 
brasileira. Além de ter significativo peso histórico na formação da nação, os países africanos 
também são parte do movimento adotado pela política externa brasileira. O propósito 
central deste texto é mostrar essa dimensão regional relevante da inserção internacional 
do Brasil na era Lula. O trabalho está dividido em duas partes: a primeira versa sobre a 
inserção internacional da África em anos recentes e a segunda analisa a dimensão ocupada 
pelo continente na política externa brasileira. O argumento central é que o novo lugar 
ocupado pela África no cenário internacional coincide com o Brasil global.
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